Bertrand Russel wrote about Aristotle´s distinction between substance (ousía) and universal (kathoulou, in Greek):

«What is signified by a proper name is a "substance", while what is signified by an adjective or class-name, such as "human" or "man" is called a "universal". A substance is a "this", but a universal is a "such" - it indicates the sort of thing, not the actual particular thing. A universal is not a substance, because it is not a "This" ». (Russell, History of Western Philosophy, page 160)

There is a mistake on Russel´s thoughts about Aristotle. "Man" is  not an universal but a specie, i.e, a common form of similar objects, in the case, human bodies. In fact, Aristotle never consideres the essence as a universal - for example: the essence horse, the form of all real horses, is not a universal - although he considers sometimes the genus - for example: animal - as a universal. He wrote, refuting the theory of separated Ideas from sensible world of Plato:

« But perhaps the universal, while it cannot be substance in the way in which the essence is so, can be present in this, e.g., animal can be present in man and horse. Then clearly there is a formula of the universal. And it makes no difference even if there is not a formula of everything that is in the substance: for none the less the universal will be the substance of anything. Man is the substance of the individual man in whom is present; therefore the same will happen again, for a substance, e.g., animal, must be the substance of that in which it is present as something peculiar to it. And further it is impossible and absurd that the "this", i.e., the substance, if it consists of parts, should not consist of substances nor  of what is a "this", but of quality; for that which is  not substance, i.e., the quality, will be then prior to substance and to the "this". Which is impossible; for neither in formula nor in time nor in coming to be can the affections be prior to the substance; for then they would be separable from it. » (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VII, 1038b, 15-30, The Complete Works of Aristotle, volume II, Princeton/ Bollingen Series; the bold is put by me)

We must know how to interpret accurately this text . Aristotle is  criticizing the theory of Plato who sustained that archethypes - i.e., pure and immaterial forms, such as Man, Tree, and qualities, such as Kindness, Justice- are substances, i.e, individual essences. And he is also criticzing Plato  for not prioritizing the archetypes. To Aristotle, on considering a Man with Courage, it is impossible that Courage (a quality) is prior to Man (a essence) because Courage only exist in Men (or in Animals).

On Aristotle, the universal is a quality, nor a form or essence, neither a substance or materialized and individualized form . Animal is a quality, not a form. In fact, animal holds multiple forms different from each other. And the universals as such, above all genera, such as the one and the being, are qualities.

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Essentialism is defined in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy on this way:

 «essentialism The doctrine that is correct to distinguish between those properties of a thing, or a kind of thing, that are essential to it, and those that are merely accidental. Essential properties are ones that it cannot lose without ceasing to exist. Thus a person wearing a hat may take off the hat or might not have been wearing the hat, but the same person cannot cease to occupy space, and we cannot postulate a possible situation in which the person is not occupying space. If we agree with this (it is not beyond debate, which illustrates the difficulty with essentialism) occupying space is an essential property of persons, but wearing a hat an accidental one. » (Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2005, pag 120; the bold is put by us).

 The problem with this definition is that it is semi tautological, vagrant. In fact, following the optic of Blackburn, accidentalism could be defined by the same words displaced within the proposition: « the doctrine that is correct to distinguish between those properties of a thing, or a kind of thing, that are merely accidental to it and those that are essential.». So, where is the difference? But essentialism is not the same that accidentalism…It is not enough to distinguish essence from accident to produce a clear definition of essentialism.

 The right definition of essentialism is ignored by Simon Blackburn and many other cathedratic. They have the university title but not enough clarity in their ideas.

Thomas of Aquinas did not oppose essence and accident as if they were mutually extrinsic in his book «The being and the essence». He postulated that the accident - the most part of accidents - is incorporated in the essence and Hegel thought the same way. Aquinas opposed the accident to the substance, defined as the immutable part of essence.

Thus, the correct definition of essentialism is: the doctrine or family of doctrines sustaining that the essence or quiddity of a being, a thing or an idea precedes is existence - or stays behind the mutation of external appearance of that thing or idea- and determinates each act of the existence wether on an absolute or on a relative manner. Determinist predestination is a form of essentialism: all the existence is contained in the essence. Many doctrines of free will (libertarianisms) which gives emphasis to the genetic bio physical or psychological characteristics (for example: the Freud´ s Theory of sexuality, etc) are also essentialist doctrines: the existence is not absolutely but partially contained in the essence, that is to say, the existence is free within his limits, freedom or free will exists but is conditioned by a fixed a priori essence.

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© (Direitos de autor para Francisco Limpo de Faria Queiroz)