The analytic philosophers have not, as a rule, a dialectical thinking and do not know organizing frameworks with theories about free will, biophysical determinism and indeterminism, clearly arranged. They mix  species of a particular genus with species of different genera in a confused amalgam. An example is the table below. 

In «Metaphysics, the Key Concept» , Helen Beebee, Nikk Effingham and Philip Goff wrote:

Table 1

____________________________________________________________________

Position                       Determinism          Determinism                       Actual agent

                                                                  Compatible with                  sometimes act

                                                                   free will                                freely

_____________________________________________________________________

Compatibilism                           ?                                    Y                                      ?  

Incompatibilism……………. ?                                   N                                       ?   

Libertarianism………………  N                                   N                                   Y                                            

Soft Determinism…………..Y                                   Y                                          Y

Hard Determinism………….Y                                   N                                          N

Illusionism ………………….. ?                                    N                                          N

Agent causalism…………….?                                    ?                                          ?

«Metaphysics, the Key Concept», page 83, Routledge.

In this table, there is a great confusion of genera. Compatibilism and Incompatibilism belong to genus articulation, a formal genus. Illusionism and agent causalism belong to genus  cause of action: basically, the causes of an action are free will, determinism, fatalism or natural hazard. Soft Determinism is a species into compatibilism but they are hierarchized as if they were mutually extrinsec.

In the table above, a question mark is placed at the intersection of the horizontal column «Compatibilism» with vertical column «Determinism», but that is a mistake. In analytic philosophy, compatibilism includes determinism, so the letter should be Y ( yes). Another error is the question mark placed at the intersection of the horizontal column «Compatibilism» with vertical column «Actual agent sometimes act freely» because, by definition, compatibilism includes free will, free act. So, instead of a question mark there should be an Y.

And what is incompatibilism? A confuse definition of analytical philosophy. The only ones incompatibilisms are fatalism and hard determinism ( a quasi fatalism) because both exclude free will: but hard determinism is compatible with hazard and fatalism is not. Libertarianism is not an incompatibilism because it theorizes the simultaneous existence of free will and deterministic laws of nature, altough analytical thinkers sustain they are independent of each other.

What is agent causalism.? About agent causation Beebee, Effingham and Goff  wrote:

«Some philosophers hold that it is only by being and “uncaused cause” of one `s action that an agent can truly be said to be ultimately responsible for their actions and hence to act freely and be morally responsible (…) Such philosophers hold that the relation between the agent and her free actions (normally thought to be her intentions or, in more old-fashioned terms, her “acts of will” or “willings” ) is that of “agent causation”.
«Most contemporary philosophers hold that the causal relata – the entities that stand in causal relations to one another – are spatiotemporally located entities, such as events (or facts or states of affairs).(…)
«Agent causation (if it exists) is a different kind of relation, because in this case, the cause is not an event (or facts or state of affairs) but the agent herself, conceived as a substance.» (Helen Beebee, Nikk Effingham and Philip Goff, «Metaphysics, the Key Concept» , page 3-4, Routledge).

This is not absolutely clear. Agent causalism is the same as free will, it is the efficient or moving cause of free will: hence, it contains, as its species, libertarianism and soft determinism - if we can distinguish libertarianism from soft determinism, which is a controversial question. And illusionism is the same as hard determinism and fatalism. This one is not mentioned in the table.

About the table above, there is another  misconception. It makes no sense to put a question mark  at the intersection of the horizontal column «Agent causalism» with vertical column « Actual agents sometimes act freely»: by definition, agent causalism act freely.

www.filosofar.blogs.sapo.pt
f.limpo.queiroz@sapo.pt

© (Direitos de autor para Francisco Limpo de Faria Queiroz)

A cloud of confusion remains on analytical philosophy about determinism and indeterminism, compatibilism and incompatibilism. In Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia (Portuguese journal of Philosophy), Christina Schneider, of university of Munich, wrote: 

«First: There is the problem of determinism versus indeterminism. If the world is deterministic, it is held, then there is no place for alternatives, so wheter or not the result of any human deliberation, is manifested in the "extra-mental" sphere is independent of deliberation. What happens in the world is fixed once and forever from the very begining. This is the root of the disagreement between compatibilists and imcompatibilists. Compatibilists say that indeterminism is not indispensable ingredient for freedom, incompatibilists opt for the contrary. (...) If the world is indeterministic an option to be taken seroiusly, then - so van Inwagen argues - the manifestation of any deliberative process is a pure matter of chance.» (Christina Schneider, Freedom is not a Mistery, in Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, Tomo 3, Fascículo 4, pagina 1274, Braga, 2007; the bold is put by me).

The first confusion of Christina Schneider is about what  is deterministic world: on saying that «If the world is deterministic, it is held, then there is no place for alternatives» she makes a remarkable error. Deterministic world is not a world subject to an absolute fatalism. In deterministic world there is the free will, the deliberation of bilions of human beings and, hence, there are always alternatives, at least apparently. In fact,  the inteligence and capacity of deliberation and free action of man are indeterministic factors to be attached to the deterministic character of the natural world.  There are, always, alternatives because of men´s deliberations and actions: for example, a government may choose to install a nuclear plant in a region of Portugal or Spain (determinism of nuclear energy) or to not install it (absence of determinism of nuclear radiation). Considering both cases, there will be different results in each one. So, it is wrong to state about deterministic world, as Christina Schneider does, that  «What happens in the world is fixed once and forever from the very begining». She confuses determinism with fatalism. On fatalism, there are no alternatives, on determinism there are various alternatives for the same situation or being.

The second confusion of Christina is the confusion on compatibilism and incompatibilim. She argues:«Compatibilists say that indeterminism is not indispensable ingredient for freedom, incompatibilists opt for the contrary.» This is wrong. What is compatibilism? It is any formal theory that articulates two entities or two different ways of being. The so-called soft determinism is a compatibilism because reconciles or harmonizes free will and determinism biophysical (Example: a giant wave in the sea approaches but I am free to shove it or not). The so-called libertarianism (free will and absence of byophisical determinism)  is also a compatibilism - «Oh, heresy!», claim analytical philosophers  - because it reconciles the human free will with the freedom of biophysical nature, without fixed  and necessary laws.

What is indeterminism? Indeterminism is the absence of necessity, the existence of  chance, random. There are two kinds of indeterminism: in human´s minds and in biophysical nature. Free will is a part of indeterminism although no analytical philosopher conceives this. It is impossible to exist free will without indeterminism. The essence of free will is indeterminism.

www.filosofar.blogs.sapo.pt

f.limpo.queiroz@sapo.pt

© (Direitos de autor para Francisco Limpo de Faria Queiroz)

What is libertarianism?

Acording to the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, it is :

«Libertarianism (metaphysical)  A view that seeks to protect the reality of human free will" by supposing that a free choice is not causally determined but not random either (see DILLEMA OF DETERMINISM) .» (Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2005, pag 210)»

The distinction between compatibilism and libertarianism is not clear in this Dicitionary and in minds of many second class philosophers as Blackburn and his epigonous, including almost all authors of portuguese manuals of philosophy for secondary schools (Pedro Galvão, Luis Rodrigues, Desidério Murcho, Pedro Madeira, Paulo Ruas, Aires Almeida, etc): 

«II-Soft determinism or compatibilism. Reactions in this family assert that everything you should want from a notion of freedom is quite compatible with determinism. (...)«III-Libertarianism. This is the wiew that, while compatibilism is an evasion, there is a more substantive, real notion of freedom that can yet be preserved in the face of determinism (or of indeterminism). In Kant, while the empirical and phenomenal self is determined and not free, the noumenal or rational self is capable of rational, free action»  (Simon Blackburn, Dictionary of Philosophy, pag. 141; the bold is put by us).

There is a lack of clearness! Why is compatibilism "an evasion"? Blackburn is unable to explain it rationally to us.

On presenting the moral of Kant as an example of libertarianism, as he defines it, Blackburn commits an error. Kant is a compatibilist: admits free will, base of categorical imperative, and no free will (an inferior will, slave of the desires), base of the hypothetical imperative. There is not a self preserved from deterministic influence because the self, acording, to Kant has a double nature: noumenal ( a priori) and phenomenal.

Nobody has his free will preserved from biological and social pressions - except God, perhaps- so libertarianism, as they define it, is an ilusion, a confused view.

Compatibilism is a form of libertarianism - defining this, correctly, as the theory which admits free will - and the other form of libertarianism is free will coexisting with indeterminism in biocosmical nature.

Portuguese Note:  Em 31 de Janeiro de 2008, às 21.30 horas, na biblioteca municipal de Beja, lançamento do livro «Os acidentes em Lisboa na Astronomia-Astrologia, Accidents and Astrology in U.S.A.» da autoria de quem escreve este blog. Convidam-se os professores e amantes da filosofia, do sul de Portugal e Huelva e Sevilla, a estarem presentes. É uma festa para nós, os filósofos, apoderarmo-nos das alavancas da epistemologia, das ciências (história social e política; astronomia) e inflectirmos estas, nomeadamente a história mergulhada no oceano de um certo indeterminismo.

www.filosofar.blogs.sapo.pt

f.limpo.queiroz@sapo.pt

© (Direitos de autor para Francisco Limpo de Faria Queiroz)

About the conflict free will/ determinism the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy exposes the following theories:

«Reactions to this problem are commonly classified as: (I) hard determinism. This accepts the conflict and denies that you have real freedom or responsibility. (II) soft determinism or compatibilism. Reactions in this family assert that everything you should want from a notion of freedom is quite compatible with determinism.» (…) (III) libertarianism. This is the view that , while compatibilism is only an evasion, there is a more substantive, real notion of freedom that can yet be preserved in the face of determinism (or indeterminism).( The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Great Britain, 2005, pag 141)

 This division is wrong, equivoque.

What is the difference between compatibilism and libertarianism? Compatibilsm is a species of the genus libertarianism. They can ´t be organised on a hierarchy at the same level, as if they were  mutually extrinsic concepts. They are not.

 A correct hierarchy of theories can be obtained by dialectical method of the main contradiction: there are two poles, one of them consisting of fatalism and no  fatalism without free will ( four theories) and the other consisting in Libertarianism (two theories). Let ´s see our division, much clearer than these one proposed by Simon Blackburn:

1. THEORIES EXCLUDING FREE WILL

 Indeterminist Fatalism. All facts in bio cosmic nature are predestined not by constant laws (determinism) but by a capricious destiny impossible to be predicted, and man is not free, does n ´t possess free will.

Determinist Fatalism. All facts in bio cosmic nature are predestined by constant laws (determinism) and, thus, can be predicted, and man is not free, does n ´t possess free will. The Oxford Dictionary calls this view hard determinism.

Indeterminism no fatalist without free will. The facts in bio cosmic nature are «free» and unpredictable, that is to say, there are no constant laws of cause-effect (determinism), and man is not free, does n´ t possess free will, but his will is manipulated by biological and geological impulses inside and outside.

Determinism no fatalist without free will. The facts in bio cosmic nature can be predicted partially, as they obey to determinist laws, and the same with the human behavior, ruled by determinist laws, without free will, but hazard obstructs fatalism.

2. THEORIES ADMITING FREE WILL

Determinist Libertarianism or compatibilism. The facts in bio cosmic nature are under constant laws of cause-effect (determinism), and man is free, possesses free will.

Indeterminist Libertarianism. The facts in bio cosmic nature are «free» and unpredictable, that is to say, there are no constant laws of cause-effect (determinism), and man is free, possesses free will.

The ingredients to build these theories and modes of reality are three: hazard, necessity and free will (hazard under man ´s control).

 www.filosofar.blogs.sapo.pt

f.limpo.queiroz@sapo.pt

© (Direitos de autor para Francisco Limpo de Faria Queiroz)