Eliminativism is the contrary of additivism (this term is created by us, supposedly).

What is eliminativism? It is the group of theories and the philosophical attitude that suppress any part of reality or any knowledge structure.

Simon Blackburn dissociates wrongly scepticism from eliminativism:

«This is in fact Hume´s characteristic position. There is no prospect of us doing any better than thinking, for example, in terms of a spatially external world of independent objects. Nature forces us to think, and it would be absurd to recommend otherwise. Yet we may have no reason whatsoever for supposing that the thoughts we then have are true: indeed we may have good reasons to suppose them false. Scepticism does not imply eliminativism, although as the example of Hume shows, the cost of holding one and not the other is a pessimistic view of the place of knowledge and reason in human life.»  (Simon Blackburn, Truth, A Guide for the Perplexed, pag. 115).

On truth, eliminativism is a genus and scepticism is a specie of it: this means that scepticism, on the measure that eliminates the certainties, is a form of eliminativism.

www.filosofar.blogs.sapo.pt

f.limpo.queiroz@sapo.pt

© (Direitos de autor para Francisco Limpo de Faria Queiroz)